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Carrol: State of Idaho v. Freeman

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ConstitutionalAmendment e Rescission of
Ratification * Extension of Ratification Period
State of Idaho v. Freeman
529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981)
I.

INTRODUCTION

N State of Idaho v. Freeman' the District Court of Idaho ruled that once the
Congress has "set a reasonable time limit for the states to act in order"
to ratify a proposed constitutional amendment, Congress cannot thereafter
change the period for ratification." The court also held that a state has the power
to rescind its prior ratification of a proposed amendment before "unrescinded
ratification by three-fourths of the states." 3
The case was granted certiorari and at this writing, is now pending before
the United States Supreme Court." On June 30, 1982, the extended time for
ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)' expired6 without
the necessary approval by three-fourths of the state legislatures. Therefore, this
current controversy over the construction of article V has apparently become
moot. However, the issues addressed by the district court may later be presented
by future proposed constitutional amendments.
'529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981).
'Id.at 1155.
'Id. at 1154.
4National Organization For Women v. Idaho, 102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982).
'The full text of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment is contained in the following quotation:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), that the following article is proposed
as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and
purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
states within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"Article "Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any state on account of sex.
"Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
"Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification."
S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.(1971).
'The Congress passed House Joint Resolution 638 by a simple majority vote. This resolution extended
the time for ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment from March 22, 1979 to June 30, 1982.
The original deadline for ratification was a seven year period contained in the preamble to the ERA. This
seven year period was consistent with similar time periods for ratification contained in the preambles for
the twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-sixth amendments. 124 CONG. REC. H8, 664-65
(daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. S17, 318-19 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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The District Court of Idaho in Freeman was presented with a number of
issues requiring interpretation of article V of the Constitution.7 Since case law
on article V has been limited, the questions presented in State of Idaho v.
Freeman are of first impression.
On March 22, 1972, the United States Senate passed a joint resolution
proposing the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution. The House of
Representatives had earlier adopted the resolution on October 12, 1971.1 In
order to become the twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution, the
proposed ERA had to be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states.'
On October 6, 1978, the Senate passed House Joint Resolution 638 by a
vote of sixty to thirty-six.'0 This resolution which had earlier been approved
by the House of Representatives by a vote of 233 to 189,1" extended the
ratification period for the ERA to June 30, 1982. Originally "the time for
ratification would have expired on March 22,' 1979, seven years from the date
of proposal of the ERA."' 2 The extension period was approved by only a simple
majority in both Houses of Congress, while the original time period had been
adopted by a two-thirds concurrence. This factor was widely discussed at
Congressional hearings conducted on extending the ratification period for the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment. 3 The general consensus of the
constitutional scholars testifying at those hearings was that Congress could extend
the period for ratification of the ERA by a majority vote.'"
'Article V of the Constitution states in its entirety:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall proposed Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several
states, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid
to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of threefourths of the several states, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided that no Amendment which may
be made prior to the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Eight shall in any manner affect
the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no state, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of its Equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S CONST., art. V.

'Kanowitz and Klinger, Can a State Rescind Its Equal Rights Amendment Ratification: Who Decidesand
How?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1977) [hereinafter Can A State Rescind]. The Senate passed the resolution
by a vote of 84 to 8 while the House adopted the resolution by a vote of 354 to 24.
'U.S. CONST., art. V.
'0124 CONG. REC. S17,318-19 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
'1124 CONG. REC. H8,664-65 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978).
'Comment, ERA: The Effect of Extending The Time For Ratification On Attempts to Rescind Prior
Ratifications, 28 EMORY L.J. 71 (1979) [hereinafter Effect of Extending The Time ForRatification].
I Extending the Ratification Periodfor the ProposedEqual Rights Amendment: Hearingson H. J. Res.
638 Before the Subcommittee on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the Committee on the Judiciaryof
the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. at 1 (1977-1978) [hereinafter Hearings,Extending Ratification].
"Id. Most of the constitutional scholars participating in the Hearings believed that Congress could extend
the period for ratification of the ERA without allowing rescission by the states who had earlier ratified
the amendment. The scholars who advocated this position were Lawrence Tribe, William Van Alstyne,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Thomas Emerson, and William Stanmeyer. The only two scholars who opposed
Congressional extension of the ERA without allowing rescission were Erwin Griswold and Charles L. Black.
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When the ratification period ended on June 30, 1982, thirty-five states had
passed the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, three short of the requisite thirtyeight state legislatures needed to adopt the amendment. '5 In that same period,
however, five states attempted to rescind their prior ratification of the ERA.
These five states are Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, South Dakota, and
Tennessee. 16
On May 9, 1979, the states of Arizona and Idaho, together with legislators
from both states, filed this action in the District Court of Idaho. The plaintiffs
sought both injunctive and declaratory relief, asserting that states had a right
to rescind their prior ratification of a constitutional amendment and that Congress' action in extending the period for ratification was void.I
In February, 1977, the Idaho State Legislature, by a simple majority vote,
declared its prior ratification of the ERA void. Subsequently, Idaho's Secretary
of State "certified Idaho's rescission to the Acting Administrator of the General
Services Administration."' 9 Idaho brought this action after the Administrator
of the General Services Administration, Rowland G. Freeman, questioned the
validity of Idaho's rescission.2"
In 1979, Arizona's State Legislature passed House Concurrent Resolution
No. 2014. This resolution requested that the Arizona Attorney General and
the Department of Law bring an action challenging Congress' extension of the
deadline for ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.2 As a result
of this resolution, Arizona joined in this suit. Arizona had initially rejected
the proposed ERA and had never purported to ratify the amendment.2 2
On June 13, 1979, four individual legislators of the Washington State
Legislature moved to intervene as plaintiffs in this case to pursue the same issues.
District Judge Callister granted their motion to intervene on June 13, 1979.23
'"529 F. Supp. at 1112.
"Id. Idaho ratified the ERA on March 24, 1972 and rescinded its prior ratification on February 9, 1977;
Nebraska ratified the ERA on March 29, 1972 and rescinded it on March 15, 1973; Tennessee ratified
on April 4, 1972 and rescinded on April 23, 1974. Kentucky ratified the ERA on June 26, 1972 and rescinded
on March 17, 1978, however, the rescission resolution was vetoed by the State Lieutenant Governor while
the Governor was out of state. South Dakota ratified the ERA in 1973 and rescinded it on March 23,
1979, after Congress had extended the period for ratification.
"529 F. Supp. at 111.
"Id. at 1113-14. The resolution repealing ratification passed the Idaho House by a vote of forty-four to
twenty-six, and the Idaho Senate by a vote of eighteen to seventeen. 1977 Idaho Sess. Laws 950.
11529 F. Supp. at 1114.
2DId.
21979 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1039.
"2529 F. Supp. at 1114.
"Id. Prior to intervening in this suit, the four individual legislators had brought an action in the Western
District of Washington seeking a nullification of Congress' act extending the period for the ERA's ratification. Oliver v. Ray, No. C79-140T (W.D. Wash. 1979). The suit was based on the claim that Washington's
earlier ratification of the ERA was conditioned on the amendment being ratified by three-fourths of the
states within the initial seven year period. When the legislators filed their motion to intervene in Freeman,
they filed a notice for voluntary dismissal of this suit.
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The court's ruling in Freemanis in conflict with both the Supreme Court's
apparent trend involving article V issues, and most of the recent scholarly opinion on point."4 As a result of this departure, and the fact that the ERA failed
to be adopted, this decision is likely to have slight precedential value.
Nonetheless, the district court's discussion of the ERA in light of recent changes

in the political question doctrine has significance in interpreting article V.
II. JUSTICIABILITY
The district court in Freemanruled contrary to the Supreme Court's deci-

sion in Coleman v. Miller25 in finding that the issues requiring constitutional
interpretation of article V were justiciable.2" In 1939, the Supreme Court in

Coleman held that a ratification after a prior rejection of a constitutional amendment is a political question. 27 The Court said: "[tihe question of the efficacy
of ratifications by state legislatures, in light of previous rejection or attempted
withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political

departments with ultimate authority in the Congress.... ,,2" The Court found
two reasons for finding the rescission-ratification question a political determination. First, it found no constitutional language or statutory provision requiring judicial action. 29 Second, it acknowledged that Congress had previously
determined that subsequent action regarding constitutional amendments was

ineffective "in the presence of an actual ratification." 3 Congress made this

finding in determining the validity of the states' ratifications concerning the
fourteenth amendment." In holding that the question was a political one, the
Coleman Court ignored several of its prior cases that had ruled article V issues
32
were justiciable.
"Judge Callister possibly should have removed himself from deciding this case due to his conflicting position as a Regional Representative of the Mormon Church. The Mormon Church had officially opposed
the ERA and Congress' extension of the ratification period of the proposed amendment. Defendant's
counsel had earlier moved for Judge Callister's disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 contending his
impartiality might be foreclosed. However, Judge Callister denied this motion claiming his impartiality
was not foreclosed and that in the Mormon Church, religion and government operate in separate spheres.
State of Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979).
"307 U.S. 433 (1939). This case involved a challenge to Kansas' ratification of the proposed Child Labor
Amendment.
2529 F. Supp. at 1145-46.
"307 U.S. 433. There was no majority opinion in Coleman. Three justices limited non-justiciability to
the narrow facts of the case, while the four concurring justices insisted that all article V issues were political,
and the two dissenting justices regarded the issues raised in Coleman as justiciable. The dissenters pointed
out that the Supreme Court had "adjudicated similar issues without hesitation" in Dillon v. Gloss, 256
U.S. 368, 471 (1921) (Butler, J. dissenting). Can a State Rescind, supra note 8, at 986.
"1307 U.S. at 450.
29Id.
"Id. at 449.
"Comment, Rescinding Ratification Of ProposedConstitutional Amendment - A Question Forthe Court,
37 LA.L. REv. 896, 905-08 (1977) [hereinafater Rescinding Ratification]. On July 21, 1868 "both houses
of Congress, without real debate, passed a resolution declaring that three-fourths of the states, including
Ohio and New Jersey had ratified" the fourteenth amendment and that it was part of the Constitution.
Ohio and New Jersey had earlier withdrawn their ratification of the amendment. This congressional action was never tested in court and is not considered strong precedent due to the era in which the amendment was passed.
"The cases prior to Coleman where the Supreme Court had rules that issues relating to the amendment
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The court in Freeman refused to agree with the defendant's contention
that the Supreme Court's ruling in Coleman was controlling.33 Instead it found
that the questions of "efficacy of a rescission and the proper procedure for
establishing a time period for ratification" should be interpreted by the
judiciary. 3"' In ruling that the issues are justiciable, the court analyzed the standards enunciated in recent cases in judging what constitutes a political question."
Article V speaks only of ratification and no mention is made of rescission.
Chief Judge Callister, who wrote the decision in Freeman, looked specifically to the six criteria pointed out in Baker v. Carr 36 in determining what constitutes a political question.3" The court in Freeman found that Coleman was
not controlling.3" In concluding that there was no compelling reason for the
district court to withhold its jurisdiction, the Freeman court pointed out that
"the nature of the question of the effectiveness of a rescission of a prior ratification is essentially different from the question presented in Coleman as to the
effect of a ratification after a prior rejection." 3 9 A rescission "revokes the state's
assent to being included in the consensus" and requires no further inquiry."°
On the other hand, a valid ratification requires both the state's consent to a
proposed amendment and "congressional assessment of contemporaneousness. '""' It is therefore appropriate to treat a ratification after a prior rescission as a political question, while analyzing a rescission after a prior ratification as one for judicial inquiry. "2 While it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
would make such a technical distinction in distinguishing the issues in Coleman
process of the Federal Constitution were justiciable included Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Dillon
v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Virginia,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798); Can a State Rescind, supra note 8, at 982-84.
"1529 F. Supp. at 1146.
3'Id.
"The three most important cases which the court in Freeman reviewed in finding the issues justiciable
were Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Dyer v. Blair, 390
F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. IIl. 1975). In Dyer the district court was presented with similar issues to those in
Freeman, and it ruled that the issues were justiciable. Former Judge Stevens, now Justice Stevens, in writing
the opinion, distinguished the issues before the court from those in Coleman. However, as one scholar
noted, if Dyer was a Supreme Court "decision rather than the opinion of a three-judge panel, it is unlikely that such care would have been taken to distinguish Coleman." Rescinding Ratification, supra note
31, at 922-23.
36369 U.S. 186 (1962).

F. Supp. at 1124. The six criteria noted in Baker are:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; [3] or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; [4] or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; [5] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; [6] or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
369 U.S. at 217.
11Id. at 1146.
17529

"Id. at 1145.
"Id. at 1146.
"Id. at 1145-46.
,21d.
Published
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from those in Freeman, it is this author's opinion that the court in Freeman
correctly analyzed that the issues before it were justiciable. As one scholar noted,
the political question doctrine should not "frustrate judicial review of the validity
of ratification or rescission of Constitutional amendments."4 3
III. RESCISSION AFTER RATIFICATION
In ruling whether a state may change its initial action on a proposed amendment, the Freeman court considered three separate approaches" before adopting the approach "that both the subsequent acts of ratification after a rejection and rescission after ratification should be recognized."" Accordingly, the
court in Freeman recognized that Idaho's rescission was effective. It further
held that the same was true for any state which properly rescinded its
ratification."
One limitation to the Freeman court's view is that once three-fourths of
the states have ratified a proposed amendment at the same time, "the amendment automatically becomes part of the Constitution.... , After this point,
attempted rescission by a state is ineffective. '
The decision that a ratification can be rescinded is based on the observation that the structure of article V of the Constitution indicates that the states
must determine "what the local consent is" when acting on a proposed
amendment.4 9 In Dillon v. Gloss,5" the Supreme Court pointed out this observation saying, "all amendments must have the sanction of the people of the
United States, the original fountain of power, acting through representative
assemblies .... ," The court in Freemanbelieved that if the state's local sentiment changes during the time period for ratification, it should be allowed to
2
rescind its prior ratification in order to reflect the true will of the people.
In reaching its decision the Freemancourt also argued that it was illogical
to "impute more finality to ratification than to rejection. . . ."I' The court
argued this was especially true since a state's act of ratification has no binding
"Note, The Equal Rights Amendment: Will States Be A llowed To Change Their Minds?, 49 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 657, 669 (1974). Several other scholars have noted that article V issues should be considered justiciable
including Erwin Griswold, former Solicitor General of the United States, see Hearingsat 110-11 (testimony
of Erwin Griswold); Leo Kanowitz and Marilyn Klinger, Can a State Rescind, supra note 8, at 981; and
Grover Rees, Rescinding Ratification, supra note 31, at 918-22.
"529 F. Supp. at 1147-50.
4Id. at 1147.
"Id. at 1155.
"Id. at 1147.
"Id. at 1147-48.
"Id. at 1148.
"256 U.S. 368 (1921).
"Id. at 374.
"1529 F. Supp. at 1148.
53Id.
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effect until three-fourths of the states have concurred during a reasonable period.

Furthermore, by not allowing a state to rescind its ratification during this interim period, states may become "hesitant to act" in ratifying a proposed

amendment.",
The Freemancourt's view has been advocated by some of the most respected

constitutional scholars," however, it is this author's contention that the Freeman
court's approach in allowing rescission after ratification is both unpractical and
unconstitutional. A better approach would be to allow only the act of ratifica-

tion after a prior rescission.", Rescissions of proposed amendments after a prior

ratification would be treated as a nullity. This view has been supported by the
Congress" and several distinguished scholars. 8
The language of article V supports the conclusion that rescission after
ratification is void. Article V speaks only of ratification and, therefore, rescissions arguably were not within the framers' intent. 9 Allowing states to rescind
their vote after prior ratification of proposed constitutional amendments could
also lead to absurd results. A state could ratify and rescind a proposed amendment several times during the period for consideration.6 0 This could result in
uncertainty in counting the states which have consented to a proposed

amendment .61
On several occasions Congress has shown its disapproval of allowing subsequent rescissions of proposed constitutional amendments. The fourteenth
amendment is often cited "to support the view that attempted rescissions are
ineffectual. '"62 Congress passed a resolution on July 21, 1868 declaring that
34Id.
"These scholars include William Stanmeyer, Professor of Law at Indiana University Law School and Charles
Black, Professor of Law at Yale Law School. Hearings, Extending Ratification, supra note 13, at 360-61
(testimony of William Stanmeyer); at 72 (testimony of Charles Black).
"This approach was considered and rejected by the court in Freeman at 1147. The third approach considered by the Freeman court was that once a state has acted either ratifying or rescinding the proposed
Constitutional amendment, any further action is void. 529 F. Supp. at 1147.
"Effect of Extending The Time For Ratification, supra note 12, at 78-86.
"The scholars supporting this view include James Madison, Lester Orfield, and, more recently, William
Van Alstyne and Thomas Emerson. Orfield contends that such leaders as James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton objected to attaching any conditions or reservations during the period of the drafting of the
Constitution. As a result, no reservations are contained in the text of article V. L. Orfield, The Amending
of the Federal Constitution (1942) at 68 [hereinafter Amending of Constitution];ProposedEqual Rights
Amendment Extension, H.R. REp. No. 95-1405, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978) [hereinafter H.R. REP.No.
95-1405]; Hearings, Extending Ratification, supra note 13, at 65,67 (testimony of Thomas Emerson).
"Can a State Rescind, supra note 8, at 1001-02.
'*H.R. Rep. No. 95-1405, supra note 58, at 12. As William Van Alstyne said in his testimony before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives:
No State ought to consider an amendment to the Constitution under the misimpression from this
body that it may do it with some sort of celerity or spontaneity because it will always have this
interval of additional years while other States are looking at it to reconsider.
That in my view is an atrocious way to run a Constitution.
"1529 F. Supp. at 1147.
"Effect of Extending The Time For Ratificaiton, supra note 12, at 79.
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the fourteenth amendment had been ratified, with New Jersey and Ohio being
counted as states supporting the amendment despite their attempted rescissions.
The state legislatures of both Ohio and New Jersey had passed resolutions rescinding their prior ratifications, but the Senate treated these rescissions as
ineffective.6 3
On four occasions Congress has also failed to pass amendments which
would have allowed states to rescind their ratification of constitutional amendments. In 1925, the Wadsworth-Garnett Amendment which would have altered
the text of article V to include rescindment, failed to even reach the floor of
either house. 6" Three other proposed amendments which would have allowed
states to rescind their ratification were also defeated during 1978-1979.65
IV.

CONGRESS' EXTENSION OF THE. RATIFICATION PERIOD

The court in Freeman ruled that Congress had no power to extend the
period for ratification of the ERA beyond the seven year period originally
established by Congress. Once Congress sets a time period for ratification it
cannot be changed. As a result, the court held Congress' effort to extend the
void. 66
period for ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment was
In reaching its decision, the Freemancourt refused to recognize the defendant's contention that the proposed Equal Rights Amendment contained no
time limitation in its text. The defendant contended that since the seven year
period originally set for ratification was only a part of the proposing resolution and not the text, Congress' extension of the time period was not improper.
Following inferences in Dillion v. Gloss, the court in Freeman refused to
67
recognize the defendant's substance-procedure dichotomy. Furthermore, the
Freeman court felt "that in order to fulfill the purposes for fixing a time limitation for ratification as outlined in Dillon" Congress could not change the period
for ratification once it was made.68
In Dillon v. Gloss the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of deciding
whether the seven year ratification period set by Congress for the eighteenth
amendment was unconstitutional. 69 The Court held that it was proper for Congress to set a reasonable period for ratification of a proposed amendment but
that Congress was not compelled to do so. Congress' chosen period of seven
61H.R. Rep. No. 95-1405, supra note 58, at 13-14.
6"Effect of Extending The Time For Ratification, supra note 12, at 87.
"Id. at 87-88. These three proposed amendments were connected with House Joint Resolution 638 which
extended the period for ratification of the ERA.
"1529 F. Supp. at 1152, 1154-55.
6'Id. at 1151-52. The defendants' substance-procedure argument analyzed in Freemanconcerns the language
of the proposed ERA. Since the text of the ERA contains no time limitation, the defendants contend
that the seven year ratification period in the preamble of the amendment serves only as a guideline. As
a guideline, the period for ratification can be changed by Congress.
6Id.
"256 U.S. at 368.
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years was held to be reasonable . 70 In reaching its decision, the Court in Dillon
made no reference to a substantive-procedural dichotomy pertaining to setting
a period for ratification. 7 '
The Freeman court, in ruling that Congress' effort to extend the period
for ratification of the ERA was void, relied heavily on the fact that in Dillon
no substance-procedure dichotomy was made for setting a ratification period.
Since there was no difference recognized in Dillon, the Freeman court summarized that in order for Congress to change the time period for ratificiation
it "must flow from the Congress' power to set the mode of ratification. ' " 2
As earlier indicated, the Supreme Court in Dillon foreclosed this possibility.73
In drawing its conclusion, the district court in Freeman failed to recognize
the distinct difference in the textual format between the eighteenth amendment
and the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. 74 The eighteenth amendment's
text specifically contained a time limitation for ratification.7" On the other hand,
the text of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment contained no time limitation for ratification. Instead, the proposed twenty-seventh amendment's
preamble contained a seven year limitation acting as a guideline, following the
same format as the twenty-third through twenty-sixth amendments. 76
In considering the issues before the Court in Dillon, there was no reason
to offer dicta on the effect of Congress setting time limits for ratification of
proposed amendments in the preamble instead of the text. This issue was not
before the Court. The court in Freeman incorrectly read inferences into Dillon
by contending that there was no difference between placing a time limitation
in a proposed amendment's text or preamble. This author believes that the district
court in Freemanshould have ruled that Congress' extension of the time period
for ratification of the ERA was a proper function of its power under article
V of the Constitution. This view has been supported by several eminent constitutional scholars. 7 There is a distinct difference between placing a time
limitation for ratification in the preamble as opposed to the text of a proposed
amendment.
"Id. at 376.

"1529 F. Supp. at 1151.
72Id.

"1256 U.S. at 376.
"Vieira, The Equal Rights Amendment: Rescission, Extension and Justiciability,S. ILL. U.L.J. 1, 14

(1981).
"The pertinent part of the eighteenth amendment reads, "This article shall be inoperative unless it shall
have been ratified as an amendment... within seven years from the date of submission ....
U.S. CONST.
amend. XVIII, § 3.
"Hearings, Extending Ratification, supra note 13, at 40-41 (testimoney of Lawrence Tribe, Professor of
Law at Harvard University).
"These scholars include Lawrence Tribe, William Van Alstyne, Thomas Emerson, and Charles Black.
Id. at 40-41 (testimony of Lawrence Tribe); at 115 (testimony of William Van Alstyne); at 63-64 (testimony
of Thomas Emerson); at 68 (testimony of Charles Black).
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In Dillon v. Gloss" and Coleman v. Miller" the Supreme Court indicated
that the period for ratification of a proposed amendment is a matter for Congress to decide. Since the proposed Equal Rights Amendment contained no
set period for ratification in its text, it cannot be said that the states reasonably
relied on the guideline contained in the preamble. The terms of the amendment itself were unchanged by Congress' extension of the ratification period
0
and the ratifications would still be sufficiently contemporaneous. Furthermore,
even if a state like Washington ratified the amendment while specifically noting
the original ratification period contained in the preamble, the state's ratification stands. As Lester Orfield noted in his book, The Amending of the Federal
Constitution, the framers' intent in drafting article V was that no conditions
8
could be attached to ratification of a proposed amendment. ' As a result, conditions attached to ratifications of proposed amendments are void. Since the
Equal Rights Amendment contained no ratification period in its text, the question
of whether Congress could change a deadline set out in the text of a proposed
amendment need not be answered."
The court in Freeman further indicated that regardless of whether Congress could extend the ratification period of the ERA, its action by majority
vote was in violation of article V. Congress must act "by two-thirds of both
83
Houses when exercising its article V powers." The court noted that Congress
is bound to act within the parameters of article V when exercising powers granted
to it under article V. Under article V, the Constitution grants Congress the power
to propose amendments only by a two-thirds vote of both houses. No other
power is given. Following the language of article V, the Court concluded that
if Congress can extend the ratification period of a proposed amendment, it
must do so by a two-thirds vote.. Since Congress extended the ratification period
'
of the ERA by a simple majority vote, its act was void."
During the Congressional Hearings on House Joint Resolution 638, a few
scholars supported the argument that Congress could only extend the ratifica85
tion period of the ERA by a two-thirds vote. However, most of the scholars
"256 U.S. at 376.
"1307 U.S. at 454.
"Hearings, Extending Ratification,supra note 13, at 40-41 (testimony of Lawrence Tribe). In Dillon the
Supreme Court found that ratifications "must be sufficiently contemporaneous . .. to reflect the will
of the people in all sections at relatively the same period." Effect of Extending The Time For Ratification, supra note 12, at 89 (quoting 256 U.S. at 375).
"Amending of Constitution, supra note 58, at 69.
"If the issue was at hand, it is this author's contention that the issue would be justiciable, and Congress
could not change the period for ratification. In this case, a state's reliance on the ratification deadline
period would be reasonable.
"1529 F. Supp. at 1153.
"Id. at 1153-54.
"Professor Charles Black and Erwin Griswold believied that Congress could not extend the ratification
period by a majority vote. Black was of the opinion that a two-thirds vote by Congress was required to
validly extend the ERA, while Griswold believed Congress could not extend the amendment without starting
the process anew. Hearings,ExtendingRatification, supra note 13, at 68, 107 (testimony of Charles Black
and Erwin Griswold).
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who testified were of the opinion that Congress could extend the ratification
period by a majority vote."
There are several indications why Congress could legally extend the ratification period by a majority vote. First, the structure of the Constitution requires
only a super majority vote where it is specifically enumerated. To be consistent with the basic framework of the Constitution, only a majority vote should
be required in order to extend the ratification period of an amendment. 8"
Second, article V sets forth the "circumstances where a two-thirds vote
is required." 88 Just as Congress may choose the mode of ratification by a majority vote, it should only be required to extend the period of ratification for
amendments by a majority vote. 9
Third, since the time limitation of the ERA was contained in the preamble, it was not voted upon when Congress originally proposed the amendment.90
As a result, the revision of this provision should only be required to be by a
majority vote. For these reasons it is this author's contention that Congress'
extension of the ratification period by a majority vote was constitutionally
grounded.
V.

CONCLUSION

On June 30, 1982 the extended period for ratification of the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment expired. The ERA will not be made part of the Constitution since the requisite number of states did not ratify the proposed amendment. As a result, the Supreme Court will probably rule that the issues presented
in State v. Freeman are moot. While these issues will not be addressed in Freeman
it is likely that many of the questions raised in Freeman may come about again:
1.) are the questions justiciable; 2.) can Congress extend the ratification period;
3.) can a state rescind a prior ratification? While the decision in Freeman is
not binding on the Supreme Court, it may be used as a guideline by the lower
court that is first presented with these issues.
JOHN

F. CARROLL

"This list includes Lawrence Tribe, Thomas Emerson, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Id. at 40-41 (testimony
of Lawrence Tribe); at 64-65 (testimony of Thomas Emerson); at 121 (testimony of Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
"Id. at 64-65 (testimony of Thomas Emerson).
"Id.
9Id.
9°d.
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